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Williams and Goodwin: Oil and Gas in the Federal Court--Hutchinson v. McCue

OIL AN) GAS LAW IN THV, IEDERAL COURTHUTCHINSON V. McCUE
"The forms of action we have buried, but they rule us from
their graves", Maitland used to say,' when explaining present-day
causes of action.2 Perhaps a similar remark may someday be ven.
tured regarding the disposition of federal courts in equity cases,,
to exercise an independent judgment as to matters of oil and gas
law, despite recent liquidation of Swift v. Tyson.4 Prior to Eric
Railroad 'v. TompkinsO and Ruhlin v. New York Life Imsuranceo
Co., 6 important incidents of mineral servitudes had frequently been
in litigation before federal judges, and, - on one theory or another,7 - the state decisions were.fairly often disregarded. Hence,
ciation (1938) 63 A. B. A. Rep. 522;
(1939) 23 Journal of American Judicature Society 15;
(1938) 24 American Bar Association Journal 795;
(1937) 23 id. at 969;
(1938) 21 Journal of American Judicature Society 160;
Pre-Trial Practice Succeeds in One-Judge County (1937) 20 id. at 247;
Sunderland, Theory and Practice of Pre-Trial Procedure (1937) 21
id. at 125;
Pre-Trial Procedure in Wayne Circuit (1933) 16 id. at 136;
Pre-Trial Procedure - A Collection of Articles from the Journal of
the American Judicature Society.
1 &ITLAND, EQUITY ALSO THE FoRms oF ACTION AT CommoN LAv (1913)
296.
2 Note (1910) 8 MICH. L. REv. 315, 318: "The inherent and essential differences and peculiar properties of actions have not been destroyed, and from their
very nature cannot be."
See also Note (1918) 32 HARv. L. REV. 166, discussing "the theory of the
pleadings."
3 Guffey v. Smith, 237 U. S. 101, 114, 35 S. Ct. 526, 59 L. Ed. 856 (1915),
per Van Devanter, J.: "By the legislation of Congress and repeated decisions
of this court, it has long been settled that the remedies afforded and modes
of proceeding pursued in the Federal courts, sitting as courts of equity, are
not determined by local laws or rules of decision, but by general principles,
rules and usages of equity having uniform operation in those courts wherever

sitting. " '
4 16 Pet. 3, 19, 10 L. Ed. 865 (U. S. 1842), - to the effect that federal courts
were not bound by state decisions "1in the general principles and doctrines of
commercial jurisprudence." In B. & 0. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 403,
13 S. Ct. 914, 37 L. Ed. 772 (1893), Field, .T., correctly prophesied eventual
fate of the doctrine: "I have an abiding faith that this, like other errors, will,
in the end, 'die among its worshippers.' "
5304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 114 A. L. R. 1487 (1938),
squarely overruling Swift v. Tyson.
6 304 U. S. 202, 58 S. Ct. 860, 82 L. Ed. 1290 (1938), holding that the state
court construction of a contract was binding not only on the federal courts of
law, but as to suits in equity as well. See Schmidt, Substantive Law Applied by
the Federal Courts (1939) 16 TEx. L. REv. 512, 524.
7Note (1934) 40 W. VA. L. Q. 258. Even when the federal court did follow
state law, it often refused to concede the necessity of doing so. E. g., Upde-
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if equity discretion as to cancellation of oil and gas leases 8 must still
remain with the trial chancellor, then, "for as moch as conscience
is a thing of great uncertaintie", 9 the practical result of a separate
federal jurisprudence is quite likely10 to survive on, long after its
abolishment in constitutional theory.
Speculation along these lines has been prompted by an important decision of the circuit court of appeals, for the fourth circuit, defining the habendum clause in an instance where there was
failure to market gas continuously from a producing leasehold. In
Hutc]hinson v. McCue," a lease was granted of West Virginia land
for d term of ten years, and so long thereafter as oil or gas should
be produced and (royalty and) rentals paid.12 In addition to oil
royalty, the lessee agreed to pay a quarterly gas well rental of fifty
dollars, but only from the time and while the gas was marketed;13
and the lessor's free gas covenant expressly extended to three dwelling houses on the leasehold. 14 Following the instrument's execution in April, 1924, delay rentals were fully paid the lessor until,
graft v. United Fuel Gas Co., 67 F. (2d) 431 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933): "Without
deciding whether the interpretation of the contract involves the application of
a rule of property so as to constitute a holding of the court of last resort in
West Virginia, a rule of decision binding on us, we yet find these cases highly
persuasive."

8 Cancellation is the generic term used to describe an equity proceeding
brought
to establish abandonment, expiration or forfeiture of a lease.
9

HARGtAvE, LAw TRACTS (1787) 326.

10 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins held Swift v. Tyson, in its ninety-six years of
legal history, an unconstitutional course of conduct on the part of the federal
courts, (perhaps within Amendment X to the Constitution).
11101 F. (2d) 111 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939). It is to be observed the majority
opinion expressly admits the applicability of local decisions (at p. 116):
"These questions must be decided upon the facts hereinbefore set forth in conformity with the controlling law of West Virginia."
12 The testing provision was that of a drill "or" pay lease, with a surrender
clause. If there were no drilling within six months, the lessee agreed to pay
in advance the usual delay rentals of a dollar an acre per year, in quarterly
settlements, - until a well were drilled or the lease surrendered.
13 Leslie v. Chase National Bank, 83 F. (2d) 1013 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936),
Printed Becord therein, p. 53, 55, lower court opinion per Cochran, District
Judge (1933): "This calls for a construction of the provision of the lease as
to the payment of royalties. Payments thereof are to be made 'from the time
and while the gas is marketed.'
This expression can be expanded so as to
read 'from the time the gas begins to be marketed and while it continues to
be marketed' without enlarging its meaning. . . . It was only in case it (the
lessee) was unable to market it (the gas) that its (the lessee's) obligation to
pay ceased. In that contingency it (the rental) was to cease because there is
no other stipulation to pay than while the gas is marketed."
14 In 1937, five of the seven subdivision interests were receiving free gas from
the leasehold, - two of whom were petitioners in the case. True, on April 9,
3934, only three dwelling houses were supplied; yet one of the dissentients in
fact "hooked on to the line" as late as March, 1937. RECORD, pp. 99-100.
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five years later, producing gas wells were drilled. 1' When the first
two wells had been completed, the operator marketed the gas and
met the gas well rentals as these accrued. Unfortunately, by the
time the third producer was drilled in 1930, the marketing ceased,
so all were accordingly shut in. There was thus no revenue out
of the leasehold for either lessor or lessee, from the fall of 1930
until December, 1934.16 Meantime, after the lessor's death in 1931,
the tract subject to the lease had been partitioned among the heirs;
and there were now seven claimants to the rentals. 17 In January,
1934, the receivers1 8 of the operator company effected an arrange-Looking at the RECORD, (p. 35, Finding of Fact, No. 2), - "All delay
rental called for by the lease, in the total amount of $1244.50, was fully paid
to the original lessor by the Hamilton Gas Company, as it accrued."
16 Rental was paid on the first well up to October 15, 1930, - and on the
second, up to September 4, 1930. The third had never been turned into pro.
duction lines, so no rentals were paid during the fixed term with respect to that
well. The ten-year period was up, April 9, 1934. In December, 1934, marketing
was resumed: on January 28, 1935, tender was made as to rentals earned after
December 20, 1934, - the date on which the wells were cut into the pipe lines
of the purchaser. Rentals were regularly offered the petitioners, down to
October 1, 1936. Meantime, November 19, 1935, cancellation proceedings were
begun. Thereafter, on May 18, 1937, when the cause came on for trial, a
final tender was made in open court of the maximum amounts the three dissenters might claim, - assuming there were liability for rentals during the
cessation of operations, 1930-1934.
17 Each of the seven partition deeds contained the following provision:
"And it is further understood and agreed .. .that the land hereby
conveyed is subject to an oil and gas lease . . . dated on April 0,

1924; and that any royalties or incomes arising from said lease shall
be divided equally among the direct heirs of .. . deceased."

isOfficials of the lessee, Hamilton Gas Company, began negotiations for sale
of the gas with the United Fuel Gas Company during the summer of 1930,
immediately after the wells had been shut in. After considerable delay, the
contract, dated November 18, 1931, was finally executed in July, 1932, - about
six months after the institution of receivership proceedings against the lessee
in the federal court for the southern district of West Virginia. No doubt these
financial difficulties impeded the operator's chances for a lengthy marketing
arrangement.
Scarcely a year later, before the purchaser had taken any gas, 77B litigation
developed over the question of venue for the corporate reorganization proceeding. Eastern creditors preferred to take it elsewhere, but the circuit court of
appeals for the second circuit eventually decided that, with the company's
principal assets in this region, venue should be laid in West Virginia. In ro
Hamilton Gas Co., 79 F. (2d) 97 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); cert. denied, 2906 U. S.
647, 56 S.Ct. 307, 309, 80 L. Ed. 460 (1935). Parallel litigation hero resulted
in a decision favoring the district chosen by the debtor, having regard to the
provisions of the Act. Hamilton Gas Co. v. Watters, 75 F. (2d) 176 (C. 0.
A. 4th, 1935); cert. denied 296 U. S.647, 56 S.Ct. 307, 309, 80 L. Ed. 460
(1935); Note (1936) 22 VA. L. REv. 464. These various struggles have done
much to settle the whole issue of venue for reorganizations in bankruptcy.
No gas was sold under the 1932 contract, because of the depression and consequent delay in completing the pipe line to the eastern seaboard. Venue
litigation was not conducive to further negotiations with the purchaser during
1933 and early 1934. However, in October, 1934, a modification of the 1932
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ment for reduced payments with four of the seven interests,19 the
other three refusing any such compromise tender. When marketing
of the gas had been resumed at the end of that year, the receivers
formally offered the three dissentients their respective shares of the
maximum amount of well rental" that could possibly have accrued
during the period the wells were shut in. After rejecting the offer,
the three subdivision owners in due course filed a petition, in the
lessee's bankruptcy proceeding, for cancellation 2' of this fully developed lease as to their lots,- on two of which, as it happened,
the three wells were located.
There could be no dispute as to the fact that the fixed term
had expired on April 9, 1934, and, further, that neither marketing
nor gas well rental then existed. On the other hand, the three producing wells represented substantial investment by the operator ;22
23
and the free gas was in fact being utilized on the leased land.
Moreover, only three of the seven interests objected to continued
operation, the others being wholly satisfied with the settlement
reached. It was uncontroverted that, during the period while the
wells were shut in, the lessee made periodic tests of pressures, kept
the equipment in order and paid the proper taxes.2 4 Indeed, the
contract was effected, so that two months later, the Hutchinson leasehold was
connected up with the United Fuel lines, and marketing resumed once more.
It is thus essential to realize that all this time receivers and trustees were in
charge of the lessee company, with their tenure hardly an undisturbed one.
19"In order to effect an amicable settlement of the controversy with the
lessor's heirs over well rentals while the gas was not being marketed, the receivers in January, 1934, agreed with the four respondent heirs to pay to each
$100.00 in cash, and his proportionate share of 50c per acre per annum until
the gas could be marketed, at which time well rentals were to be resumed at
the rate provided for in the lease." Finding of Fact, No. 8.
20RECORD, pp. 50-51. The formal tender to each petitioner was in the amount
of $586.90, as being the maximum sum of his respective share, - just -s if
marketing had continuously been in progress, 1930-1934. The operator's
amended answer in this proceeding, filed May 24, 1937, set forth a willingness
also to pay to each of the four assenting interests the amount of $273.45, being
the difference between the above maximum and the compromise payments already accepted by them.
21 The theory of the bill, (according to the amended petition, filed July 8,
1937), seems to have been (1) abandonment, as of July 1, 1930, or (2) termination on April 9, 1934, at the end of the ten-year period. In correspondence
prior to suit, it was suggested too that the lease "had been forfeited ' .
22 Total cost of wells, $37,232.04; erecting lines to wells, $8,542.90. RECORD,
p. 96.
23 The use of the free gas for three dwelling houses, prior to April 9, 1934,
did not of course serve in and of itself to extend the lease beyond the fixed
term. Anderson v. Schaffner, 90 W. Va. 225, 229, 110 S. E. 566 (1922). See,
however, Ketchum v. Chartiers Oil Co., 5 S. E. (2d) 414 (W. Va. 1939).
2- RECORD, p. 36. Finding of Fact No. 7.
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only factual issue before the bankruptcy judge had to do with the
"equities" of the case. The lessee contended that in July, 1930,
when the wells were closed, there was no buyer for the gas except
possibly on a temporary and unsatisfactory sufferance basis.
Owing to the depression, it was claimed, no adequate market then
became available until December, 1934.2' The three petitioners insisted that there had always been a market at hand, -for
the
wells were already connected with the lines of the prospective purchaser, who had utilized the production since completion of the
wells in 1929.26 In other words, the controversy on the facts really
became a question as to whether the operator had used due diligence
in marketing.
The federal judge27 found in favor of the operator and dismissed the petition for cancellation, holding there had been no expiration, abandonment nor forfeiture of the vested estate in the
leasehold. On appeal by the petitioners, the circuit court of appeals 28 reversed the decree of the district court, and held, in effect,
the lease had terminated at the end of the fixed term, - the senior
circuit judge dissenting. 29
Curiously enough, the appellate
opinion continued the arrangement as to the four assenting interests and permitted the lessee to operate the wells, the petitioners
receiving merely three-sevenths of the net proceeds of gas sold. 0
25 This the lower court found as the fact. REcor D, p. 35. The lessee's argument was to the effect that (1) the purchaser prior to July, 1930, never offered
to buy on the basis of a long-term arrangement; (2) that the most that purchaser ever offered was to take the lessee's gas on sufferance until a larger
line could be built to the field of an affiliate producer; (3) that the lessee immediately undertook protracted negotiations with United Fuel Gas Company,
who eventually did purchase the output of the wells; and (4) that there was lio
other market available. Naturally, part of the foregoing was controverted by
petitioners' witnesses.
28 The contention of the petitioners was simply that the real facts wore
otherwise than the lessee claimed. In brief, it was asserted that (1) the
lessee refused an existing market at hand in order to speculate on the chance
of a good long-term contract for all the company's other leaseholds; (2) that
the prior purchaser definitely needed the gas and would have bought it; (3)
that even a temporary basis of marketing, as regards the lessee's obligation to
the lessor, was better than simply shutting in the wells; and (4) that suddenly
breaking off existing contacts with an existing market, in July, 1930, was
wholly unwarranted.
27 The opinion of MeClintic, District Judge, (dated May 14, 1938), is contained in the printed REcoRu, pp. 34-43.
28 101 F. (2d) 111 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938), opinion of the court by Soper,
Cire. J., with Northeott, Cire. J., concurring.
29 Parker, Cire. J., dissenting, 101 F. (2d) 111, 123.
30 Since the production of the petitioners' gas was thus wholly proper, the
lessee was entitled to deduct production costs. Cf. Williamson v. Jones, 43 W.
Va. 562, 27 S. E. 411 (1897).
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Each side then sought unsuccessfully a writ of certiorari 3' from
the United States Supreme Court, on differing contentions that the
decision was in direct conflict with applicable West Virginia law.It is pertinent therefore to ascertain whether the circuit court
actually has disposed of the litigation by employing a Swift v.
Tyson technique.
In part, the task of the court was to interpret the habendum
clause,-the fixed term pus the "so long as production and rentals
paid" extension, - in the light of the royalty provision that
promised rentals only during marketing. The difficulty lies in the
separate historical significance of each important paragraph of the
modern oil and gas lease. One cannot construe such a deed as the
ordinary bilateral agreement between two parties bargaining at
arm's length, and ignore the slow evolution by which these various
quasi-independent provisions were gradually formulated.3 3 They
have all been skilfully contrived for the purpose of facilitating a
great industry, while yet concealing vital implications as to necessary development of the leased minerals. The habendum, for
example, has grown out of unsatisfactory experiments with noterms ' and long term leases into its present fixed exploratory period
coupled with a production term for the life of the field. Similarly,
its very language in the Hutchinson case recalls an early stage of
West Virginia oil and gas jurisprudence. 5
3' McCue v. Hutchinson, 60 S. Ct. 75, 84 L. Ed. 78 (U. S. 1939).

32 The three petitioners contended that West Virginia law required complete
relinquishment of the wells by the operator, since they now owned the gas in
fee, as the result of the appellate court's decision on the termination point.
Moreover, it was also argued that according to local decisions, the reservation
of rentals in favor of the four assenting heirs died with expiration of the
lease itself.
The lessee stressed an alleged misconstruction of the habendum clause, and
pointed out that no such inequitable forfeiture of a vested estate, (as it was
said resulted here), was possible in West Virginia practice.
3
3 Compare the opinion in J. J. Fagan & Co. v. Burns, 247 Mich. 674, 226
N. W. 653 (1929), with the attempt of a federal court to construe a lease within
its four corners as though it were a simple exchange of promises, - in Lester
v. Mid-South Oil Co., 296 Fed. 661 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924).
34 For example, Wilson v. Reserve Gas Co.; 78 W. Va. 329, 88 S. E. 1075
(1916), indicated disadvantages in a no-term lease. See Simonton, The NVature
of the Interest of the Grantee Under an Oil and Gas Lease (1917) 25 W. VA. L.
Q. 295, 312.
35 The Hutchinson lease habendum contained an extension clause, "so long
as production and rentals paid." Originally, a few decades ago, this provision
read, "production or rentals paid.y In Bettman v. Harness, 42 W. Va. 433,
26 S. E. 271 (1896), the court held that "or" should be construed to mean
"and": thus it became impossible for a lessee to extend the flxed period merely
by paying delay rentals indefinitely, in no-term lease fashidn. Since that time,
the extension clause her6 has usually contemplated a lease for the life of the
,field, assuming the lessee has diligently developed and fairly met his royalty
obligations.
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The essential rule involved here is that completion of a paying well in and of itself creates a vested estate.30 Older West Virginia decisions even stressed mere discovery, (provided diligent
development followed), in contrasting the lessee's right prior thereto as being something inchoate or executory.37 No doubt these
court utterances mean simply that the successful operator will be
protected in equity against every hazard, excepting that of his own
serious misconduct.3 8 In any event, local law has founded the
polity that the vested interest in a fully developed lease can be lost
only through a course of action or inaction amounting to abandonment"8 or justifying a decree of forfeiture. 40 With the fixed term
defining only the maximum exploratory period, its expiration becomes wholly immaterial in determining
the extent of the vested
41
estate created by the so long as clause.
36 Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan, 65 W. Va. 531, 64 S. E. 836 (1909), syl. par.
4: "The discovery of oil or gas under a lease giving right of exploration and
production, unless there is something in the lease manifesting a contrary intention, is sufficient to create a vested estate in the lessee in the exclusive right to
produce oil or gas provided for therein - a right, however, which may be
lost by abandonment, by failure to produce oil or gas, or pursue the work of
production, or development of the property.I'
37 The doctrine originated in a dictum of Venture Oil Co. v. Fretts, 152 Pa.
451, 460, 25 Atl. 732 (1893): "The title is inchoate, and for purposes of exploration, until oil is found. If it is not found, no estate vests in the lessee,
and his title, whatever it is, ends when the unsuccessful search is abandoned."
In State v. South Penn Oil Co., 42 W. Va. 80, 24 S. E. 688 (1896), and Core v.
New York Petroleum Co., 52 W. Va. 276, 43 S. E. 128 (1903), it was held that
discovery vested in the lessee the title to the oil and gas.
38 The theory "does not signify much when the relation lietween the lessor
and lessee is examined", - per Poffenbarger, J., dissenting in Musgrave V.
Musgrave, 86 W. Va. 119, 124, 139, 103 S. E. 302 (1920). Perhaps it amounts
only to this, - that the courts will aid the lessee who is engaged in producing,
to the extent of construing the "so long as" clause to denote merely a condition subsequent by which the operator's investment may be lost. And, for such
a condition subsequent to come into play, the wrong committed must have
been of a very grave nature.
39"As a matter of actual decision, the doctrine of implied covenants In
mineral leases has thus far been limited to those cases in which it has been invoked to ....

make effective the principle of surrender by operation of law,

when the premises have been abandoned after discovery of mineral and delay
rentals have ceased .... ," per Poffenbarger, J., in Carper v. United Fuel Gas
Co., 78 W. Va. 433, 438, 89 S. E. 12 (1916).
40 In order for the trial chancellor to decree forfeiture, an implied condition
must be found for violation of which the lessee's vested interest will be cancelled, - a sort of equitable right of re-entry for condition broken invented by
the court. The condition of adequate development so implied may in the particular litigation have to do with the omission to drill protection wells to prevent
drainage of the minerals, - as in the Carper case, ibid.; or, with the neglect to
offset additional wells against fraudulent drainage, - as in Adkins v. Huntington Development & Gas Co., 113 W. Va. 490, 168 S. E. ' 366 (1933); or, "with a
totally inexcusable failure to produce and sell the gas" , [101 F. (2d) 111, 1203,
- as in the present instance.
41 "There is no holding anywhere, so far as I can find, that such rights are
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As an original question, it may be conceded that the habendum
is susceptible of an interpretation more favorable to lessors.
Granted the lease should be construed against the lessee, 42 its
language would exclude implications promoting the industry. A
keen, severe and even malevolent scrutiny could do away with the
vested estate theory: surely, one might insist, a profit a prendre4"
once conveyed is no more or no less executory whether or not the
act of severance is incomplete. And, after all, the habendum
limitations have to do with termination, not forfeiture. The ordinary tenant's term for years is not held to be forfeited, because
that period has expired. Nor, analogously, does equity shrink
from holding in a proper proceeding that a fee simple determinable
has run out, - or that the life estate durante viduitate ended
through remarriage. As a matter of fact, a very fair argument
might be put up for enforcing literally the habendum: certainly,
there is nothing against public policy in so construing it,- if one
were only able to ignore innumerable authorities to the contrary.
The trouble is that fertile judicial minds, with extraordinary talent
for devising expedients in the early chaos of oil and gas law, have
long ago settled an important doctrine, - that the habendum clause
does not mean exactly what it says.
The circuit court of appeals held in the Hutchinson case that
terminated other than by abandonment or by forfeiture for breach of condition", per Parker, Cire. J., dissenting, 101 F. (2d) 111, 123, 127. "If oil or
gas was produced within the five years given for exploration the full term thereof was as surely for as much longer as oil or gas should be produced, as it was
for the term of five years in which to explore"l: Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan,
65 W. Va. 531, 533, 541, 64 S. E. 836 (1909). "We can see very little strength
in the claim that the lease has expired by its own terms at the end of the tenyear period. If there had been no development, and a vested interest had not
accrued, then the payment of delayed land rental would not extend the right to
drill after the ten years given for that purpose": MeCutcheon v. Enon Oil &
Gas Co., 102 W. Va. 345, 353, 354, 135 S. E. 238 (1926).
42 Bettman v. Harness, 42 W. Va. 433, 26 S. E. 271 (1896); Steelsmith v.
Gartlan, 45 W. Va. 27, 29 S. ]. 978 (1898). The principle of construction does
not hold, however, where the lease was prepared by the lessor: Yoke v. Shay,
47 W. Va. 40, 34 S. E. 748 (1899).
43 Simonton, supra n. 34. In other words, a profit to hunt and fish, to
cut timber, to mine coal or to exploit oil and gas, - is a completely vested
incorporeal legal interest, right from the moment of delivery of the deed of
grant. Whether it will ever be successfully exercised in the future, is wholly
immaterial from the angle of real property law: possibly on some basis of
essential error, or mutual mistake of fact, the conveyance might be set aside
in equity if there never had been any game, - or timber, or coal or fugacious
minerals, - on or under the grantorys ]and. Of course, there is no title to the
personal property, where the profit is actually developed, until discovery and
reduction of the substance to possession. The alleged "vested estate" of the
West Virginia courts is somewhere midway in between the concepts of realty
and personalty.
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the fully developed lease, with its three producing wells, had "expired under the terms of the contract for failure" to pay rentals
and to market "with due diligence". 4 So the fixed period of the
habendum became a termination provision, when the ten years had
finally elapsed: the extension clause never came into operation,
since its condition precedent was not satisfied. For this drastic
result, reliance was placed on the leading West Virginia abandonment case,4 z although the federal court refrained in mild fashion
from definitely characterizing the lessee's conduct as "a technical
abandonment." It would be difficult to find a decision more at
variance with West Virginia practice, in advancing the theory that
the fixed term controls the duration of a productive leasehold where
the lessee has temporarily suspended marketing. No dexterity can
uphold that interpretation as representing local law.
It may be suggested, nevertheless, that the present case is
right in its result, but wrong only in its reasoning. Such an approach to the problem would have to assume the lessee enjoyed a
vested estate by reason of his developed leasehold, as already discussed, and that his estate could be lost in this jurisdiction only
through cancellation based on abandonment or forfeiture. The first
of these two grounds would have to be discarded at once: the
lessee's care of the wells, along with the compromise settlement of
January, 1934, conclusively negatives any argument for abandonment. The only conceivable theory in support of the decision would
then have to be forfeiture for violation of an implied, condition,
if the rule of Carperv. United Fuel Gas o.6 can be borrowed over
4t101 F. (2d) 111, 121.
45 Parish Fork Oil Co. v. Bridgwater Gas Co., 51 W. Va. 583, 42 S. E. 655

(1902), - where a cessation of operations for eighteen months after the drilling of a dry hole, together with other conduct by the lessee evincing an intention to relinquish the leasehold, was held to constitute an "abandonment".
Obviously, abandonment is used by the courts in the layman's use of the word,
- just as a tenant is said popularly to "abandon" the house he has Tented
from the landlord; it is not the technical abandonment of a chattel personal,
where the owner deliberately casts it away and thereby divests himself of title.
One cannot in theory abandon realty, except possibly in Spanish-settled states
of the South West. What these cases really mean, (as was observed in the Carper opinion), is that a type of surrender by operationof law may result from a
course of conduct on the part of the oil and gas lessee, provided there has later
been action taken by the lessor in reliance thereon.
46 78 W. Va. 433, 442, 89 S. E. 12 (1916), holding "an implied obligation on the part of the lessee to drill a well for protection against drainage,
upon necessity therefor and the lessor's demand for such action, within any
rental period for which Tent has been paid, with notice of intention to rof,se
to accept further rentals, and right in the lessor to declare a forfeiture of the
lease for non-compliance with such demand," would afford full and ample
protection to the lessee under a fixed term lease, (who complained against nondevelopment where there was drainage).
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into this type of litigation. The implied condition here wold have
to be invented for the occasion, yet obviously a court of equity need
not hesitate on that account. Presumably it would infer the necessity of due diligence in marketing from producing wells, with forfeiture of the lease as the sanction for failure to meet the requisite
standard. In view of McGraw Oil Co. v. Kennedy, 47 the implied
condition would also take into consideration the omission to tender
full gas well rental over a seriously-long four year period.
If the Hutchinson decision is to be classed as forfeiture, many
obstacles must be surmounted. Foremost among these is an equity
principle denying forfeiture for mere failure to pay money :48 the
remedy at law is ordinarily so adequate as even to preclude jurisdiction over such an equity bill. 49 Here, too, the omission to pay
gas rentals was backed up by a ruling from the circuit court of appeals, for the sixth circuit, denying money judgment against this
very operator on a similar set of facts.c It was not unreasonable
to infer that the course of conduct was legitimate, which had been
pronounced legitimate by the sages of the law elsewhere. Equity
could not presume any wanton disregard of the lessee's financial
obligation: the forfeiture would have to be on some theory that it
was gravely improper under existing conditions to shut in the wells
and thereby to cut off the flow of rentals." The next obstacle in
4765 W. Va. 595, 64 S. E. 1027 (1909). In that case, under a "so long as
production" habendum, a profitable gas well had been drilled but capped, so
that there was no marketing of the gas. On the other hand, the lessor used 'he
free gas covenant and for seven years accepted payment of the annual $200.
gas well rental. Suit was then brought to cancel the lease for a forfeiture
based on failure to market the gas. The court held squarely the lease was not
forfeited because of non-marketing, provided the lessee paid or tendered gas
well rental. In effect, such payment extended the lease beyond its fixed term.
4s Headley v. Hoopengarner, 60 W. Va. 626, 55 S. E. 744 (1906); Castle
Brook Carbon Black Co. v. Ferrell, 76 W. Va. 300, 85 S. E. 544 (1915); Engel
v. Eastern Oil Co., 100 W. Va. 301, 303-4, 130 S. E. 491 (1925).
49 There would, of course, be equity jurisdiction in the event an accounting
were sought. Moreover, on a possible theory that royalty represented purchase
price for the sale of the profit, it might be argued that specific performance
should be available against the lessee to compel such payment. Without some
such basis for equity jurisdiction, ordinarily the lessor's bill could not be retained and other relief given.
ro Leslie v. Chase National Bank, 83 F. (2d) 1013 (C. C. A. -6th, 1936),
supra n. 13.
51 The present EditorialNote expresses no opinion whatsoever on the specific
issue as to whether, in a proper proceeding with all other legal and equitable
requirements fully satisfied, there should be cancellation of a gas lease for
forfeiture based on failure diligently to market or to pay well rentals over a
four-year period. So far as is known, the present litigation offers the first
instance of involuntary termination for such a reason of a lessee's vested estate
in a producing gas leasehold, by a West Virginia state or federal court, where the question of "abandonment" is not fairly raised on the facts.
Naturally, the factual controversy between lower court judge and the major-
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the way of the petitioners would then be a probable requirement
that, prior to cancellation for violation of such an implied condition, notice be served on the lessee to use proper diligence in
marketing,12 - with a reasonable time allowed within which to
comply.5 3 West Virginia doctrine, as declared in the Carper case,
would hardly dispense with this substantive condition precedent,
unless possibly the four-year default were deemed serious enough
to render formal demand unnecessary.54 Suppose these difficulties
are averted; there is still the problem of the operator's insolvency.
Keeping in mind the notion of forfeiture,- of course if it were
termination, there would be no issue,5"- applicable local law insists on protection of other creditors."' The lessor cannot re-enter
ity opinion, as to the lessee's conduct in 1930, is wholly beyond the scope of
this Note.
52 Howerton v. Kansas Nat. Gas Co., 82 Kan. 367, 108 Pac. 813 (1910);
American Wholesale Corp. v. F. & S. Oil & Gas Co., 242 Ky. 356, 46 S. W.
(2d) 498 (1932); Berthelote v. Loy Oil Co., 95 Mont. 434, 28 P. (2d) 187
(1934).
53 The locus poenitentiae is always available in such an equitable proceeding: there is a true analogy here to the flexible discretion of early English
chancery. As a matter of fact, the present case offers an interesting side light
on such a requirement. The order of events runs as follows:
1. In the latter part of 1933, the Hutchinson heirs made demand
on the lessee for payment of rentals, (Appellants' Brief, p. 16). Relying on Leslie v. Chase National Bank, liability for such payment
was denied.
2. Prior to 1934, the lessee's receivers were engaging in securing
reductions in the delay rental rate for the various leaseholds throughout the region. On January 29, 1934, the compromise arrangement
was effected with four of the seven Hutchinson interests.
3. On April 9, 1934, the "ten year period" expired. Three weeks
of
later, counsel for petitioners notified lessee that "abandonment"
the lease was claimed by his clients.
4. In October, 1934, the original 1932 agreement with United Fuel
Gas was modified; and, during the following December, the gas was
once more marketed. Counsel again notified the lessee that Its lease
had been "forfeited".
In January, 1935, gas rental payments were
tendered for the period of the marketing.
5. Suit was begun November, 1935. 'When trial opened in May,
1937, tender was made to petitioners of the maximum amounts which
could possibly have been claimed.
It will be observed that formal notice to market diligently was never actually
served on lessee.
.4 Gadbury v. Ohio etc. Gas Co., 162 Ind. 9, 67 N. E. 259 (1903) ; Soaper
v. King, 167 Ky. 121, 180 S. W. 46 (1915); Hitt v. Henderson, 112 Olda. 194,
240 Pac. 745 (1925).
55 Soper, Circ. J., carefully notes this distinction, (101 F. (2d) 111, 121]:
"Forfeiture for such a reason is not favored in West Virginia, as we have
shown above. But we know of no decision in which the courts have assumed
to extend the period of a lease which has expired under the terms of the contract for failure to prosecute the work with due diligence."
5 Pelzel v. Pen-Mar Coal Co., 101 W. Va. 247, 250-1, 132 S. E. 310 (1926):
"We see no equity in turning over to the lessors property worth many times
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and, by so doing, secure an inequitable preference.5 7 Unquestionably, the very considerable investment in the wells would merit
comparison with maximum rental shares of the three claimants,
particularly having regard to the tender made. In short, equitable
relief through cancellation will seldom meet with approval in the
supreme court of appeals, when so many hazards confront the
litigation.
The foregoing discussion has viewed the proceeding as though
it were the original lessor of the entire leasehold who procured
cancellation. In the Hutclinson case, however, only three out of
seven partial assignees were complaining. Divisibility of express
covenants,"8 and probably of implied ones as well, 9 occurs by
operation of law once the appurtenant tract has been subdivided.
But in order to forfeit in this jurisdiction, it is a condition and
not a covenant that is implied. The common law has for centuries
adhered to a policy of refusing to divide conditions, violation of
which would enable legal forfeiture.60 Implied equitable conditions
are usually treated similarly in mineral development suits,though not without criticism." Beyond doubt, divisibility should
never be permitted in equity, where a thoroughly unfair result
would follow:62 irrespective of the petitioners' motives, the wells
on their lands must inevitably drain the gas from the other four
lots. Partial forfeiture ought always to be denied, in the absence
of complete protection for others. Be this as it may, the appellate
court escaped the dilemma by its holding that the lease expired.
The relief granted was partial termination, -which would seem
their

claim, when, by so doing, other creditors may be prevented from or hindered and delayed in the collection of their demands."
57 "Equity will not permit the enforcement of a forfeiture in an inequitable
....
manner," Wheeling etc. Ry. v. Triadelphia, 58 W. Va. 487 (syl. par. 5),
52 S. R. 499 (1905).
68 Dickinson v. Hoomes' Adm'r, 8 Gratt. 353 (Va. 1852).
69 There should be no problem as to division of the lessor's benefits. But as
to division of the lessee's burdens, see Standard Oil Co. of La. v. Giller, 183
Ark. 776, 779, 38 S. W. (2d) 766 (1931); Cosden Oil Co. v. Scarborough, 55 F.
(2d) 634, 638 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932). The law on this point is unsettled, and
there is ample authority to the contrary, as to divisibility of implied covenants

of the lessee.

0 Twynam v. Pickard, 2 Barn. & Ald. 105, 106 Eng. Rep. R. 305 (1818);
Leiter v. Pike, 127 Ill. 287, 326, 20 N. E. 23 (1889).
61 North Central Texas Oil Co. v. Gulf Refining Co., 159 La. 403, 105 So. 411
(1925); Howard v. Manning, 79 Okla. 165, 192 Pac. 358 (1920); Vaughn V.
Littlefield, 4 S. W. (2d) 153 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928). Contra: concurring opinion of Busby, J., in Gypsy Oil Co. v. Champlin, 163 Okla. 226, 22 P. (2d) 102
(1933).
2 ,Tones v. Pier, 124 Cal. App. 444, 12 P. (2d) 646 (1932), is an excellent
example of this.
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somewhat anomalous. If expiration of the fixed term ended the
servitude, all interests appear to be affected alike. Certainly, on
principle, the assenting heirs cannot by any receipt of money waive
termination; a new lease might be necessary, satisfying the deed
requirement of the 1931 Code,6 3 though conserving rental shares
recognized by the present decision.
Having thus terminated the- lease as to the three petitioners,
the circuit court of appeals decided that their interest "would best
be served by the continued operation of the property by the
lessee", (-reserving to them the right to show future hardship
in such an arrangement). In construction of the partition deeds,
it was held that the reservation of income from the 1924 lease
included the privilege of extending its term and waiving requirements of production and rentals;4 thus the four others became
entitled to one-seventh shares in the agreed rentals during the life
of the lease. While the result of equitable apportionment by
judicial fiat seems thoroughly fair in this unusual situation, one
wonders how to reconcile it with existing case-law. The petitioners recovered title to their minerals, yet they have no present control over the marketing. Whether or not to continue production,
or which purchaser will offer the most desirable contract: these are
questions that cannot concern the owners of the gas. The producing leasehold that expired through lapse of time as to the three
continues on, by curious logic, 65 in full force and effect as to the
rest. With a finding here in favor of partial cancellation, a resort to methods of seventeenth-century chancellors has much to be
said for it.
Hutckinson v. fCue can scarcely be described as conforming to West Virginia law, either in reasoning or in result. In its
important aspects, there is striking resemblance to the former habit
of a separate federal jurisprudence.08 As a precedent, the decision
63 W. VA. Rgv. CODE (1931) e.36, art. 1. § 1. Otherwise, it might be
argued that a tenancy from year to year is created. Of. Drake v. O'Brien, 83
W. Va. 678, 99 S. E. 280 (1919).
64J'udge Parker's observation [101 F. (2d) 111, 131), that neither Gay Coal
& Coke Co. v. Chain, 116 W. Va. 262, 180 S. E. 95 (1935), nor Updegraff v.
Blue Creek Coal & Land Co., 74 W. Va. 316, 81 S. E. 1050 (1914), is in point
for construction of the reservation in the partition deeds seems thoroughly
sound. As to the former case, see Comment (1935) 42 W. VA. L. Q. 73. In any
event, the decision here seems doubtful.
65 Professor Simonton's comment, elsewhere, seems pertinent at this point:
"One cannot help feeling that the case was decided more on what hns sometimes been termed 'fireside equities' than on sound principles.Simonton,
Extension of Term of Oil Lease Through Discovery of Oil in Less than Paying
Quantities (1918) 26 W. VA. L. Q. 79, 82.
66 Cf. Hoffer Oil Corp. v. Carpenter, 34 P. (2d) 589 (C. C. A. 10th, 1929).
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may invite unhappy lessors to seek federal court relief, if bankruptcy or diversity jurisdiction afford opportunity. According to
Francis Bacon, "things are to be determined not by arguing, but
by trying." The present experiment has not served to discredit
Swift v. Tysonq7 practice.
C. C. WILn
ROBERT

B.

MS, JR.
GOODWIN.

07 It is carious that Judge Parker should in this case have filed the dissent,
urging closer adherence to West Virginia case-law. Perhaps the best recent
justification of the principle of Swift v. Tyson was written by him in Hewlett
v. Schadel, 68 F. (2d) 502, 504 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934). His view then was that
the federal rule would "preserve a uniform body of law upon which those who
do business in other states" could depend, and which would "inevitably have
a unifying influence on the decisions of the state courts themselves."
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